

Appendix

Table A.1: Durbin-Watson Test of Serial Correlation by Policy Areas

Policy Area	D-statistic
<hr/> Without Media Attention in Regression <hr/>	
Crime	0.665
Defense	0.390
Education	0.081
Environment	0.344
Health	0.438
Welfare	0.772
<hr/> With Media Attention in Regression <hr/>	
Crime w/ media	0.898
Defense w/ media	0.400
Education w/ media	0.673
Environment w/ media	0.362
Health w/ media	0.496
Welfare w/ media	0.768

Note: Reported in Table A1 are the d-statistics generated through a Durbin-Watson test for serial correlation. Those under the heading “Without Media Attention in Regression” are the results of Durbin-Watson tests in which only public policy preferences and policy spending were included in the regression. Those under the heading “With Media Attention in Regression” are the results of Durbin-Watson tests in which public policy preferences, policy spending, and media attention were included in the regression. Serial correlation is found in all instances.

Table A.2: Dickey-Fuller Test for Stationarity of Public Policy Preferences by Policy Areas

Policy Area	P-value	
	Non-first differenced	First differenced
Crime	0.456	0.011
Defense	0.377	0.016
Education	0.907	0.005
Environment	0.466	0.040
Health	0.084	0.044
Welfare	0.171	0.012

Note: P-values represent the MacKinnon approximate p-value for $Z(t)$. Those p-values under the heading “Non-first differenced” are the results of Dickey-Fuller tests on public policy preferences without first differencing. Those p-values under the heading “First differenced” are the results of Dickey-Fuller tests on policy spending after first differencing.

Table A.3: Tests for Cointegration Among Variables by Policy Area

Policy Area	P-Value
<hr/> Without Media Attention in Regression <hr/>	
Crime	0.047
Defense	0.107
Education	0.015
Environment	0.095
Health	0.063
Welfare	0.054
<hr/> With Media Attention in Regression <hr/>	
Crime w/ media	0.029
Defense w/ media	0.124
Education w/ media	0.015
Environment w/ media	0.094
Health w/ media	0.083
Welfare w/ media	0.068

Note: P-values represent the MacKinnon approximate p-value for $Z(t)$ derived from Dickey-Fuller tests of the residuals after regression. Those p-values under the heading “Without Media Attention

in Regression” are the results of Dickey-Fuller tests on the residuals after regression in which only policy spending and public policy preferences are included for each specific policy area. Those p-values under the heading “With Media Attention in Regression” are the results of Dickey-Fuller tests on the residuals after regression in which only policy spending, public policy preferences, and media attention are included for each specific policy area.

Table A.4: Domain-by-Domain Effects

	Model A.1 (Crime)	Model A.2 (Defense)	Model A.3 (Education)	Model A.4 (Environment)	Model A.5 (Health)	Model A.6 (Welfare)
<i>Public Policy</i>	-0.369**	-0.344**	-0.171	-0.356***	-0.259**	-0.373**
<i>Preferences_{t-1}</i>	(0.161)	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.089)	(0.117)	(0.146)
<i>Spending_{t-1}</i>	-6.037	0.017	-1.164	-0.057	-0.783	-2.600
	(6.441)	(0.651)	(1.134)	(1.629)	(0.711)	(0.948)
Δ <i>Spending</i>	-6.320	-0.725	-1.414	-1.104	-0.259	-0.501**
	(4.804)	(1.666)	(1.348)	(2.351)	(0.613)	(0.298)
<i>Pres. Right-Left</i>	0.0002	-0.004***	0.0005	0.002***	0.0008**	0.0003
	(0.0003)	(0.001)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.0009)
<i>House Right-Left</i>	0.0001	0.0001	0.0003	0.0001	0.001*	-0.0004
	(0.0001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.0006)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	-0.002	-0.007	0.004	0.007**	-0.004	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)
<i>Constant</i>	0.290*	0.055	0.110	0.142***	0.206***	0.266**
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.094)	(0.045)	(0.062)	(0.118)

<i>Observations</i>	34	34	34	34	34	34
<i>R</i> ²	0.271	0.470	0.214	0.390	0.299	0.402

Note: Coefficients are directly interpretable effects of the independent variables on the change in policy preferences between time *t-1* and time *t* with panel corrected robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$

Table A.5: Effect of Policy Spending on Public Policy Preferences Excluding Welfare Policy

	Model A.7	Model A.8	Model A.9
<i>Public Policy Preferences_{t-1}</i>	-0.061** (0.026)	-0.059** (0.024)	-0.051*** (0.018)
<i>Spending_{t-1}</i>	-0.243** (0.100)	-0.233*** (0.089)	0.023 (0.099)
Δ <i>Spending</i>	-2.171*** (0.480)	-2.152*** (0.483)	-1.829*** (0.478)
<i>Media Attention_{t-1}</i>	.	-0.002 (0.002)	0.0001 (0.002)
Δ <i>Media Attention</i>	.	0.0003 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.001)
<i>Spending_{t-1} * Media Attention_{t-1}</i>	.	.	-0.058*** (0.011)
Δ <i>Spending * \Delta Media Attention</i>	.	.	-0.565*** (0.184)
<i>Presidential Right-Left</i>	-0.0002 (0.006)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	-0.0001 (0.001)
<i>House Right-Left</i>	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)
<i>GDP Growth</i>	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
<i>Constant</i>	0.041* (0.024)	0.045* (0.027)	0.030*** (0.020)
<i>Observations</i>	170	170	170
<i>Number of Policy Areas</i>	5	5	5
<i>R² Within</i>	0.159	0.162	0.182
<i>R² Between</i>	0.044	0.007	0.001
<i>R² Overall</i>	0.142	0.146	0.173

Note: Coefficients are directly interpretable effects of the independent variables on the change in policy preferences between time $t-1$ and time t with panel corrected robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p \leq 0.01$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, * $p \leq 0.10$